Abstract
Introduction
In this article we look at media managers through the prism of two distinct dimensions of analysis.
From the perspective of elite studies -our first dimension -this group is crucial for generating collectively held views (e.g. consent to war) and entrenching divisions (e.g. separation and ousting of the political opposition, named 'fifth column'). Adhering to an understanding of power and status close to Weberian 1 Elisabeth Schimpfössl, School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University College London, University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT. E-mail: e.schimfoessl@ucl.ac.uk.
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contemporary Russia. 7 Journalists, producers and editors have developed sophisticated mechanisms to handle and execute Kremlin policies, without having any clear guidelines to follow and without restricting themselves and their own creativity too severely. This is despite the fact that the Kremlin increasingly bluntly makes use of the oldest and most direct form of media politics: propaganda and control. Castells names two distinct forms of this state intervention:
(a) the fabrication and diffusion of messages that distort facts and induce misinformation for the purpose of advancing state interests; and (b) the censorship of any message deemed to undermine these interests, if necessary by criminalizing unfettered communication and prosecuting the media outlet that produced this message. 8 In reference to Russia, Castells regards self-censorship as the dominating practice of media control: people act according to 'the wise judgment of responsible journalists and, ultimately, of their managers, if they want to keep their jobs and preserve their working conditions'. 9 Although there is a lot of truth in Castells's statements, the practices of how news is produced are far more complex than simple censorship and even self-censorship. Even with Putin's further grip in power in his third presidential term, what we see on screen or read in the press by far not only the result of conscious subordination, explicit political pressure, interference or fear. Instead, television and journalistic reports disclose at least as much, if not more, of a journalist's/media personality's tastes and characteristics.
These individual characteristics, however, are not random or a-historical; they follow a process similar to that which Norbert Elias described as a shift over time from where external constraints (Fremdzwänge) coerce or impose a specific behaviour towards a state where this behaviour is internalized to an extent that they are self-constraints (Selbstzwänge) which have become routinized and quasi automatic. 10 The latter case was typical for the Soviet Union; first, coercion forced reporters and public activists to suppress their thoughts which, later, became the silently accepted normative behaviour in order to get by without trouble. 11 This process was repeated in the new millennium, if not earlier.
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Not to have the 'right instinct' is usually interpreted as lack of professionalism. 12 One could assume that there is a certain correlation between being critical of the regime and being perceived as 'unprofessional', while loyalty is associated with professionalism. There can, indeed, sometimes be a correlation, but things are usually far more complex. Not to have the 'right instinct' internalized, i.e. being perceived as 'unprofessional', is often exactly the problem of those who try too hard to toe the line. An example here are journalists and editors who anxiously try to get things right and, in this process, practice too much self-censorship. The problem here is that too much, or the wrong, self-censorship threatens to stifle creativity and make media products dull and boring.
As an embodied 'feel for the game', adekvatnost' is very closely related to a person's habitus.
According to Bourdieu, habitus is to be understood as the physical embodiment of cultural capital, deeply ingrained habits, trained skills and lasting dispositions that social actors possess due to their life experiences. 13 They guide people to think, feel and act in determinant ways. Szelényi et al. adapt habitus to post-Soviet circumstances where this internalized 'knowledge' requires an additional skill: how to navigate a rapidly transforming social space and their frequently changing rules of the game. 14 Habitus cannot be based upon calculus, but involves an unconscious relation to the field they operate in. 15 In the specific case of media managers, individuals need to have a habitus that allows them to switch fields between media and politics and function according to the immanent necessity of the field.
This study and its empirical data
Our two analytical dimensions -the elite perspective and adekvatnost' -come together in the research subjects of media managers and editors-in-chief in as much as they; first, are strongly interlinked with the power elites; second, set the rules of adekvatnost' and pass them down; and third, abide by them in their own specific way in order to preserve their positions and survive in the challenging environment of Russia's media politics. They adapt these rules to new requirements whenever necessary. This is most 
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(VGTRK) and Vladimir Kulistikov (NTV). The latter had been replaced in 2015, while the former two media managers have been in their positions for 23 and 17 years respectively. In this research, we chose not to focus on the three individuals, as their career paths and intertwinement with the Kremlin would make it very difficult to dissociate adekvatnost' from other factors which affected their professional life. Instead, we need a wider variety of media managers in order to be able to analytically establish the specific role adekvatnost' plays in their work. In this article, we will examine media managers in their role as producers of adekvatnost ' and ask what kind of adekvatnost' they have to adhere to themselves. We will examine their elite interactions in more detail. The main question behind this is: what makes these individuals in elite positions in the media survive, succeed and preserve their power positions, despite being exposed to two highly aggressive and competitive environments, politics and media?
We define media managers as both editors-in-chief and directors of media outlets. In most cases, the two roles are executed by one person, but not always. Therefore, it might not seem obvious to the media managers themselves why they ended up in one group, but from our specific analytical position it makes sense: within their media outlet they occupy a position of power and influence, and provide the most crucial link between the Kremlin and their editors, producers and journalists.
Another reason why the media managers themselves might be surprised to find themselves in this group is because they are extremely diverse. The sample of media outlets these managers represent is as widely drawn as any possible. Our cases cover a broad spectrum, ranging from state-aligned television (Channel One) and Kremlin-loyal press (Moskovskii Komsomolets, Metro, Izvestiia) to the outlets which support Russian political opposition (Dozhd, Novaia Gazeta, REN TV); from financial newspapers and news websites of general interest (Vedomosti, RBK, Lenta) to tabloids (Lifenews). As a result, these individuals enjoy very different levels of prestige, power, popularity and influence.
We conducted semi-structured interviews with the selected media managers. With two exceptions Germany where he now writes op-eds for Bloomberg. 25 The only exception here is Galina Timchenko who was ousted from her position as editor-in chief of Lenta in 2014, but currently is again a media managershe is a director general of a new media outlet set up in Riga. 26 In the first part of the article, we will examine intra-elite relations. The second part will look at adekvatnost', how it is perceived and shaped by the Russian media managers and how they relate to professional guidelines. In the conclusion we will discuss which aspects are crucial for a media manager's survival in present-day Russia.
Intra-elite relations
Power networks are paramount wherever money is not accepted as a mean of exchange. 27 The main resource required to partake in these networks is symbolic capital, gained through one's position within the system, as well as the social skills to fit in and be accepted by the networks' most powerful players. One media manager, Aleksei Venediktov, co-owner and editor-in-chief of the radio station The Echo of Moscow, euphemistically calls this socializing, which is crucial for everybody's survival, 'to share a bottle of whiskey'. 28 In 2014, in a conflict with the senior management of Gazprom Media, which owns his radio 25 Leonid Bershidsky, born 1971, is the founder and former editor-in-chief of several magazines and news websites. Since 2014 has lived in Germany, writing for Bloomberg. 9 station, he probably only managed to survive because he was wily enough to convince high-ranking bureaucrats of his loyalty. 29 To do so and, more importantly, to get away with it, informal social connections to powerful individuals were key.
Relations between media managers and the Kremlin
The Kremlin possesses vastly superior power compared to the media managers and yet seeks good relations with them. Given the influence media in Russia have on sustaining public support for Kremlin policies, keeping a stable relationship is in the interest of the both sides. Russia's media managers have become acutely aware of this and often are keen to get involved in politics; for example, via governing bodies such as the Public Chamber or supervisory boards of ministries. Even if the role of these bodies in the Russian political system is merely symbolic, it nevertheless gives them opportunity to cultivate crucial networks, maintain good relations with one's peers and, more importantly, with key players in the Kremlin. 30 Power networks are to a large part invisible to the public, but once rumours about them appear in social media, interview statements and commentaries, they are quickly rendered subject to scrutiny, suspicion and speculations. 31 Most widely discussed by academics and observers of Russia are the notorious weekly meetings between important editors-in-chief, heads of the most important television channels and Kremlin officials. 32 Although the practice of organizing regular meetings between high-ranking politicians and media managers/high-profile journalists is clearly not a Russian invention, but takes place throughout the world, in Russia they have a specific agenda. 33 
Inclusion into media managers networks
Muratov himself is an interesting case; even though he heads one of the most oppositional newspapers he is considered by his peers, among them very regime-loyal ones, as a friend and vice versa: 
Dmitrii] Kiselev (presenter at Vesti Nedeli and head of Russia Today media holding). But I know
Sungorkin as a person and we are friends. 42 Social, semi-formal or informal interaction are part and parcel of what it means for media managers to act appropriately in their roles, that is, of being adekvatno. Just like media elites around the globe, Russia's media managers have their own rituals of how to negotiate common ground and differences.
Where there are opposing political views or conflicts of interest, friendly interactions become especially important as a sign of reliability and professionalism. According to Ernst, his colleagues let their guards down when among their peers and express opinions quite similar to his own:
When the major media managers sit in a restaurant together, they are always very honest with one another. Often they say very different things from what they say in public. It's predominantly smart people who understand how the world works. Which is why I hardly ever have problems with my colleagues. 43 These informal operations are usually hidden to researchers; however, some of our interviewees alluded to them. What has become obvious is that a shared set of values is crucial for participants to be accepted into these exclusive, closed networks. The nucleus of these circles is dominated by people (predominantly men) born in the 1960s; that is Ernst's and Muratov's generation. Despite their different paths in post-Soviet Russia, they still speak a common language and share similar memories of the past; endless debates within closed Soviet intelligentsia friendship circles in narrow, cigarette smoked filled kitchens till the small hours of the morning about philosophy, repression, liberal freedoms and, most importantly, Russia's fate, past and future. 44 
Exclusion from media managers networks
Aram Gabrelianov, the head of the media holding Lifenews, appears to be excluded from higher media circles 'Lifenews is a low-budget propaganda tool', one of our media managers remarked sneeringly. 45 
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to study and, more importantly, despite the success his media holding Newsmedia, Gabrelianov has remained an outcast within the Russian community of media managers.
Historically, the fact that he left a prestigious Moscow community after graduation to move to the province and then come back did not help his integration to the higher media circles back in the 1990s. He chose a different path: being extraordinarily loyal and subservient to Putin. This subservience requires, among other things, to bash the opposition whenever possible and, more crucially, never say a negative word about Putin. 46 However, this did not help him either. Gabrelianov seems to be aware of his lack of reputation among his peers: 'I haven't got any friends there to be honest. Anyway, the media business is like a nuclear war'. 47 The low regard of tabloid press held by most of media managers undermines his position further.
In his pursuit to increase his status he took over Izvestiia -one of the most prominent and respectful newspapers, which was a very prestigious media outlet throughout the Soviet period too. However, when Gabrelianov attempted to merge the editorial team of the daily with the tabloid's editorial team, this caused much consternation. The former Izvestiia editor-in-chief was not prepared to work together with the tabloid's journalists and left the newspaper. 48 Gabrelianov's contract ran out in 2016 and was not renewed. It is assumed that the decision not to renew his contract is related to the fact that he tried to run Izvestiia in the same style as he has ran his tabloid. 49
Inclusion to, and exclusion from, Kremlin-hosted gatherings
To be part of the community of higher media managers circles requires from the individual to read the signs sent by the Kremlin correctly. Whether a media manager is in the Kremlin's good books is apparent by how often they are invited to official meetings with Putin. Just prior to our interview with Gusev, Putin had hosted a major meeting with leading media managers. 50 Generally, Gusev presents himself as an independent element in the Russian media system and demonstrates that he can judge for himself where to go, whom to meet and what articles to run. 'Nobody would ever dare to pressurize me', Gusev assures us. 'They know very well that that's pointless. Still, he perceives invitations from the Kremlin as a sign of respect. 'Last night I met Putin', Gusev is visibly proud.
'I told him directly that many of the latest amendments to the media legislation are not good at all. I told him personally that the presidential administration doesn't do things right in the media sphere'. 51 Gusev has the ideal habitus to feel comfortable in these meetings and to be perceived as good company, and yet he has to negotiate his interests carefully. The first indicators of the Kremlins' waning affection are reminiscent of Stalin's ritualistic method of excommunicating selected members of his entourage: instead of an open conflict, they get quietly side-lined. Gusev has personally been at the receiving end of this tactic: 'They might "forget" about you when they compile their guests lists, or not find time when you want to meet up with them to discuss an important issue.' 52 Gabrelianov was not present at this meeting and, furthermore, was not even aware of it despite the fact that he manages the assets of Izvestiia. This seems odd, given that even Putin-critical Muratov was invited. 'Three days ago we were in Novoogarёvo at Putin's residence', he refers to the same dinner as support for Putin's regime. 55 Novaia Gazeta serves as a fig leaf the Kremlin can refer to when justifying that there is free speech in Russia. Albeit critical of Putin, Muratov is in some respects more predictable than the Putin-admirer Gabrelianov. First, Muratov works very thoroughly and has proven that he is ready to abide by unwritten rules set up throughout the years of mutual cooperation with the authorities, which has helped protect the newspaper from potential attacks from the Kremlin. Gabrelianov, in turn, is far less concerned about thoroughness. His main aim is to be the first, which implies making mistakes -a risk for the Kremlin. Women and children of leading Russian politicians are taboo topics for Muratov, which gives Putin some peace from rumours around his supposed daughters and lovers. 56 Gabrelianov obeys these informal rules too with regards to Putin, but he occasionally rants against politicians and bureaucrats. These rants can be very erratic and, more importantly, quite painful for the authorities. Muratov is in his own way more reliable -a quality which is confirmed by his habitus: in his mentality, social behaviour and culture he is on the same wavelength and 'one of them'.
A few other media managers we have interviewed dropped out of this community. Although they were friends with some of their colleagues at the time they were heading their media outlets, they nevertheless did not fit in. They found it difficult to warm to the Kremlin officials and vice versa; they are too different in their culture and mentality. Timchenko nevertheless accepted invitations by the Kremlin once in a while ('because to be invited means that you are someone, but if you don't show your face, you are a nobody to your colleagues'); but she and the Kremlin people never grew on each other. 57 
Media managers on adekvatnost': editorial guidelines
'Adekvatnost' is in some respects the most normal self-censorship', Timchenko states, thus reiterating Castells' argument of being determined by 'the wise judgment of responsible journalists'. 60 Developing the concept of adekvatnost', we, however, seek to derive at a more nuanced analysis. In contrast to selfcensorship, adekvatnost' is not triggered by a fear of coercive consequences. On the contrary, it is perceived as a virtue rather than a limitation and as a key to success. Based on their professional experience, the media managers we have interviewed have worked out sophisticated practices which allow them to get on with their work unhindered by the current controversial political climate. Their proximity to the authorities helps them sense what is appropriate to cover in the news and how to provide this coverage.
One aspect of adekvatnost' is how media managers relate to the importance of guidelines in the dayto-day work of the newsrooms. Previously we stated that on state-owned or state-aligned channels there are no guidelines or blacklists used which help journalists perform their work. Instead, journalists and editors follow their 'instincts' to provide a news coverage which is considered appropriate and which tows the current political line. The closer a media outlet is to the Kremlin and the more loyal it is, the less transparent and consistent are its informal guidelines with regard to how to cover news because they have to adapt to the Kremlin policies -and those are in constant flux.
Back in the 1990s, when the Russian media were trying to emulate western media companies' methods, having written guidelines was a fashionable detail. It was so very different to the lawlessness around them, which rendered many written contracts worthless pieces of paper. It was also something intrinsically 'Western', quite contrary to the inherent suspicion of written rules, codes and contracts which 59 Dmitrii Muratov, interview by Elisabeth Schimpfossl.
60 Galina Timchenko, interview by Ilya Yablokov.
is historically rooted in Russian culture. Yury Lotman locates this suspicion in Russian medieval culture: whereas in Western Europe concluding a contract was a stigma-free activity without risking any offence, in Russian culture contracts were seen as the last resort, to be concluded with no one better than 'the devil'.
In other words, where there was trust, no contract was needed, conversely where there was a contract, there was suspicion. Thus, in Russia a contract was often meaningless and could be easily dismissed, while, at the same time, in Western Europe the contract was sacred and the acceptance of it shared by society. 61 Editors-in-chief with a self-perception as being modern and Western adopted guidelines in the second half of the 1990s. 'Dogma', the code of practice of Vedomosti, was one of the first guidelines to be introduced in a post-Soviet media outlet. The rules specified, among other things, that journalists must not take bribes from newsmakers, they should use several opposing sources to provide a full picture of an event, they must state the source of information and articles should be clearly structured. 62 Leonid Bershidsky, its co-author, told us in an interview what their basic motivation was: 'We wanted the paper to be different from all the others, so we put all the differentiation points in this document.' 63 Other media outlet followed suit; many never bothered. Soon the idea seemed obsolete. When, with Putin's consolidation in power, the media became increasingly controlled, following written-down guidelines became increasingly difficult, if not unfitting to editorial life. They inflicted constraints on the outlet's ability to switch strategy and line of argument if need be and adapt it to the latest Kremlin policies and its frequent changes. You know, I have worked here for 20 years and we have got nothing written down. Everybody knows the rules. If not from the beginning, they will learn them empirically. We've had some people who didn't obey the rules and we had to sack them. Of all the people I've sacked, nobody would have ever asked where the rules they had broken were written down. They knew anyway that they did wrong. What did they do? They behaved unethically; they had offended someone or acted in a way that risks litigation against us. 64 For Ernst, there cannot be any open question: 'We don't need to have written down that people shouldn't piss and shit onto the street; everybody knows it'. 65 As roguish and rough as this might sound, it does make sense in the context of Channel One, whose importance obliges the editors to be particularly careful in their approach to news coverage; less in terms of getting the facts right, but more in terms of getting things right for the Kremlin. Written-down guidelines would become a huge obstacle when the channel has to quickly react to a U-turn imposed by the Kremlin. Channel One journalists' adekvatnost' means that they are fine-tuned to respond to rapid changes whenever necessary.
Gusev explains the lack of written guidelines at Moskovskii Komsomolets with the excuse that rules, including an ethics code of practice, are clearly set down in every employment contract. Gusev adds: 'As I am the editor-in-chief, I am the chief guideline.' 66 Here yet another mechanism is revealed which characterizes all the media managers: an urge to control as many processes as possible. Gusev checks all articles which can potentially cause conflicts with the authorities himself before they get published: 'I read all the more sensitive material because it's so tricky to predict how they will respond. Okay, we all know that Putin's children are a taboo topic. But apart from that it's impossible to tell. Wherever I am -in the US, in Africa, in Europe -I always read the tricky stuff first'. 67 20 will feature in it. This is our most important ethical principle. We give them the right to reply. After all, we are not the almighty, but simple journalists. Those people are rich, powerful and often armed to the teeth. 74 This thorough extra work has at least three benefits for Muratov. First, he mitigates the risk being sued. Second, his audience does appreciate qualitative investigative work. Third, and most importantly, it makes him predictable to the authorities, which ensures peaceful relations with them, despite Muratov's oppositional stances.
Conclusion
Power structures are relational and depend on intense interaction between different elite groups.
Following Freedman, who draws attention to intra-elite interaction, we looked at media managers as elites, their relation to the Kremlin and their relationships amongst one another. To partake in both types of relationship is paramount for individuals to strengthen their position.
Russia's media managers' close connections to the authorities, and their informal subordination to them, make them an integral element of the Russian regime. Being the lynchpin between the offices in the presidential administration, the newsrooms and the millions of living rooms across the country that they influence, they know how to play the game; the rules for which were partly set by the sistema, the informal governing system of Putin's Russia. One important aspect of media managers' adekvatnost' is to maintain good relations with the authorities. They themselves have also contributed to how the sistema runs. Some our interviewees have shown exceptional flexibility, 'correctly' navigating permanently changing political environments. They have led their media outlets from the first years of post-Soviet Russia, some even from the late Soviet period, weathering the most radical changes from the Soviet communist system, the Yeltsin years turbulences, through to Putin's growing authoritarianism.
In contemporary Russia the success of media managers depends on how loyal they have been to the Kremlin and how decisive their role has been in manufacturing consensual attitudes towards the current regime. Notwithstanding this, less loyal ones also have the opportunity to preserve their position providing that they, like the loyal ones, abide by specific informal and unwritten rules of adekvatnost'. Consequently, they are the beacons that guide the rest how to successfully apply adekvatnost' principles in practice.
Important platforms for the demonstration of adekvatnost' are meetings with Kremlin bureaucrats, which 74 Ibid. not only provide an access to important decision makers in the country, but also significantly increase the status and prestige of the media managers. This, in turn, helps them to be accepted by the networks' most powerful players; and staying in these ranks indicates that the manager abides by the rules of adekvatnost' accepted by the sistema.
For the Kremlin this networking is equally beneficial. In this way they can keep their hands on the pulse of the media and ensure their control over them. For this purpose the Kremlin has fostered regular meetings with the senior media management of important outlets. It is true that meetings between highranking bureaucrats and media managers/high-profile journalists exist all over the world and governments are keen on influencing media products. What is, however, specific in the Russian case is that these kinds of meetings are frequently acknowledged in public, treated as the norm, and are regarded as a basic and fundamental professional skill.
As for the personal connections between media managers, we have encountered two major attitudes.
The first is that elites want to be sure that their peers are reliable and speak the same language. Trust is created more easily where individuals share the same or a similar habitus. Even though their political views and approach to work sharply diverge and their media outlets treat the Kremlin policies very differently, Muratov and Ernst are compatible in their habitus, and in personal life they can enjoy each other's company.
They grew up in similar environments at a similar period in time with similar values. This also explains why Gabrelianov is excluded from both types of elite networks. The tabloid king occupies the negative end of the spectrum of Russian media managers; being a pariah amongst Russian media managers despite his ultimate loyalty to Vladimir Putin. He does not fit in and he is not someone other media managers are keen to socialize with.
The outlined principles and the interaction between the media elite and the political elite may be illustrated by the recent case of the ousted management of RBC. The former editor-in-chief, Elizaveta Osetinskaia, has been capable of socializing with the country's most powerful business and political elites, at the same time as being one of the most respectful media managers of the young generation. However, her elite interaction was not efficient enough for her to survive in the controversial environment of Russian politics. In addition to that, to survive, Osetinskaia should have made sure that all RBC investigations were backed very strongly by the members of Putin's elite. Yet such support was impossible to secure as RBC were targeting Putin and his family -the threshold one simply must not cross in Russia. In contrast to Muratov, whose media outlet can risk publishing daring journalistic investigations, Osetinskaia's social and symbolic capital within the circles of powerbrokers close to the Kremlin was not strong enough to match 22 her professional ambitions. Hence, her departure from the media holding is further evidence that Russian media elites, however close they are to the power elite, are all at its margins; very fragile and vulnerable.
To a certain extent, this article is a snapshot of the Russian media system today, but even wider, it is a snapshot of the Russian political elite in general. It is dominated by the habitus widespread among middle aged, male members, most of whom came from the Moscow intelligentsia. It was hard for Osetinskaia to get integrated due to generational gap and the socialization into different milieu and social setting. Like many media professionals of her generation the access to the most prestigious and well-funded media outlets is closed for her at the moment and like many she chose to leave the profession. What can be said for sure is that this group of middle aged men won't be around forever and the changes are inevitable.
